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WHEN THE TRUTH IS NOT ENOUGH:
TISSUE DONATION, ALTRUISM, AND THE MARKET
Michelle Oberman*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most profitable new industries that arose in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries derives from the numerous
uses identified for human tissue. Taking its cue both from advances in
medical transplant technology and also from other successful innova-
tions predicated upon finding new uses for what others have deemed
waste,' the market in human tissue involves the creative recycling of
skin, bone, and other body parts from human cadavers. Over the
course of the past twenty years, some participants in this market have
realized extraordinary profits.2
Although both involve transplantation, the market in tissue trans-
plantation has surprisingly little in common with the organ transplan-
tation industry. Beginning in the 1950s, doctors turned to organ
transplants in an effort to prolong the lives of individuals experiencing
the failure of major organ systems.3 By the 1980s, with the advent of
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. Many thanks are owed to those
who inspired and encouraged me in undertaking this research. First, to Michele Goodwin,
whose work in this area, as in the world at large, demonstrates that with enough courage and
fortitude, a single individual can change the world for the better. Second, to the many DePaul
students, in particular Jason Greis and Karyn Bass (both of DePaul University College of Law,
J.D. 2005), who persuaded me to undertake this project, and more importantly, who nurtured
me through my own difficult transitions. Third, to my colleagues and professional acquaint-
ances, whose generous comments no doubt improved this piece: Joel Frader, Steve Heyman,
Marina Hsieh, Robert Katz, and Ellen Waldman. Finally, to Alison Gorczyca (Santa Clara Uni-
versity School of Law, J.D. 2007) for her enthusiastic and creative research assistance.
1. For example, International Mulch Company has transformed more than one million old
truck tires into seventeen million pounds of shredded truck tires used for covering playgrounds
and garden areas. See Giving Old Truck Tires a Second Life, http://www.baumpub.com/publica-
tions/rpn/rpn-features/rpn_05marjf5.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). In another example, Waste
Stream Environmental, Inc. profits by turning human waste into fertilizer. 1998 Governor's
Waste Reduction and Recycling Awards, http://www.dec.state.ny.us/website/dshm/redrecy/98re-
cawd.him (last visited Feb. 22, 2006).
2. See Mark Katches et al., Making Death Pay, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 20, 2000, availa-
ble at http://www.ocregister.com/features/body/day5.shtml (describing the various manners in
which people are profiting from the tissue industry).
3. See Sean Authurs, Comment, No More Circumventing the Dead: The Least-Cost Model
Congress Should Adopt to Address the Abject Failure of Our National Organ Donation Regime,
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1101, 1104 (2005) (discussing the history of organ transplantation).
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antirejection therapies, organ transplantation procedures saved
thousands of human lives each year. 4 Today, the potential of these
procedures to extend human lives is limited largely by the shortage of
organs available for transplantation. 5
In response to this shortage and in an effort to secure fair allocation
of this scarce resource, the federal government heavily regulates the
organ industry. Steps such as the federal law requiring hospitals to
notify local organ procurement organizations of death or imminent
death, so that these organizations can arrange to solicit donations
from surviving kin, have helped to bolster the supply of available, or-
gans.6 In addition, legislators and policymakers debate the risks and
benefits of attempting to enhance the organ supply by permitting di-
rect payments to donors or their families.
There is a rich literature discussing the merits of the various options
for increasing the supply of organs available for transplantation, the
most controversial of which involve permitting the buying and selling
of organs. 7 Although I share the concerns articulated by many who
oppose a market solution to the shortage in human organs, particu-
larly to the extent that it would entail paying living donors for their
organs, this Article does not address, let alone resolve, this debate.
The ethical dilemmas at the core of the debate over organ selling
revolve around the threat such sales pose to the physical and the dig-
nitary well-being of the donors, as well as the indirect consequences to
society triggered by the commodification of human body parts. 8
These concerns are far less salient when the context is shifted to the
tissue transplantation industry. First of all, the supply of human tissue
from cadaver donors, let alone from live donors, is quite ample and is,
in any case, far less limited than the supply of human organs. 9 Thus,
4. See id. at 1105.
5. See Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ Commodification, 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 311 (2004) (discussing the inability of the American procurement model
to meet the "growing demand for organs needed by the critically ill"). See also United Network
for Organ Transplants, http://www.unos.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2006) (giving up-to-date statis-
tics on the number of persons waiting for organ transplants; on January 22, 2006 the site listed
90,689 people awaiting transplants).
6. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.45 (2005).
7. See Goodwin, supra note 5. See also Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protec-
tion of Society's Most Vulnerable Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation Sys-
tem, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45 (1995).
8. See Banks, supra note 7, at 83-97 (discussing various potential consequences of organ
selling).
9. See Anne Belli, Families of Donors Rarely Get Full Story, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 13, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 2037184. Belli noted that "[b]ecause tissue from a donor's body can be
recovered up to 24 hours after death if it is refrigerated, a far greater number of people are
potential tissue donors. And because so many tissues can be recovered from a body, dozens of
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there is less risk that market incentives necessarily will lead to ex-
ploitation and overreaching. Second, even if one seeks to retrieve tis-
sue from live donors for purposes of transplantation, such retrievals
seldom carry with them the permanent threat to the donor's health
and well-being experienced by those who sacrifice an organ. 10 At the
risk of oversimplification, my point is merely that skin will regenerate;
a kidney will not. Most importantly, other than the similarity of the
fact that the raw materials employed come from human bodies, the
tissue industry is almost completely unlike the organ industry.
As described in detail in Part II of this Article, the world of tissue
transplantation is relatively invisible and largely unregulated in con-
trast to the organ transplantation industry. This invisibility may be
attributed to several distinguishing factors. First, donated tissue is put
to far less glamorous uses than are donated organs, and as such has
not garnered public attention. With perhaps a few narrow exceptions
(e.g., heart valves), donated tissue is not used in any life-saving proce-
dures.'1 Instead, transplanted human tissue is used overwhelmingly
for "life-enhancing" procedures. For example, skin retrieved from
human cadavers can be processed into products that are used in treat-
ing burn victims or for cosmetic purposes such as enhancing lip size,
reducing wrinkles, or enlarging penises.' 2 Bones can be ground into
powder and processed for use in repairing the bones and teeth of liv-
ing individuals.' 3
Second, unlike the situation with human organs, there is at present
no shortage of human tissue. Tissue donation is approximately three
times as common as organ donation-a reality that is dictated, at least
in part, by the fact that there are so many more potential tissue donors
transplantations can result." Id. Tissue banks are able to recover tissue for fifty to one hundred
patients from a single cadaver. Mark Katches et al., Donor's Don't Realize They Are Fueling a
Lucrative Business, ORANGE CouNTY REG., Apr. 16, 2000, available at http://www.ocregister.
con/featuresfbody/dayl.shtml. Tissue bank leaders also use human remains to create new prod-
ucts, such as small pieces of crafted bone, which cost about 2,000 dollars a piece. Mark Katches,
Body Parts Good as Gold for Largest Nonprofit Tissue Bank, ORANGE CouNTY REG., Apr. 16,
2000, available at http://www.ocregister.com/features/body/dayl-knox.shtml.
10. See Bryan Shartle, Proposed Legislation for Safely Regulating the Increasing Number of
Living Organ and Tissue Donations by Minors, 61 LA. L. REV. 433, 436 (2000-2001) (explaining
that live tissue donors experience fewer risks than live organ donors because tissue donors usu-
ally donate regenerative tissue such as "blood, ovum, skin, bone marrow, and sperm").
11. See Robert A. Katz, The Re-Gift of Life: Can Charity Law Prevent For-Profit Firms From
Exploiting Donated Tissue and Nonprofit Tissue Banks?, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 943, 963 (2006)
(discussing the use of heart valves in treating patients with defective heart function).
12. See id. at 965-66.
13. See Osteotech Corporate Overview, http://www.osteotech.com/corpover.htm (last visited
Sept. 21, 2005).
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than potential organ donors.14 Thus there is little need for regulation
to ensure an abundant supply of tissue. Indeed, as discussed in Part
II.A., the absence of regulation has most definitely contributed to the
abundance of this supply, as those who solicit tissue have not, to date,
been required to disclose the manner in which donated tissue will be
used.
In addition to the distinctions between the end uses of transplanted
tissue and organs, there are major differences in the process by which
human tissue is rendered transplantable. Whereas organs typically
move quickly from donor to recipient, requiring little or no process-
ing, human tissue often passes through many third parties prior to
transplantation. As Part II.B. explains, each of these third parties is
compensated-often with significant profit margins-for the role it
plays in rendering the tissue ready for transplantation. 15
The relatively low profile of the tissue transplantation industry is
destined to change, if only because the regulatory vacuum has given
rise to several notorious scandals involving various players in the in-
dustry. 16 In the spring of 2005, the federal government set about rem-
edying these problems by proposing regulations to govern the
solicitation of human tissue from the decedant's surviving family
members.' 7 The foundation of these new federal regulations is the
belief that mandating greater disclosure by those who solicit donations
will insulate families from the risks of exploitation.' 8
This Article argues that these regulations, as drafted, offer too little
protection to families, and in addition, generate a threat to the entire
organ and tissue transplant industry. I therefore argue instead that
the federal government must encourage states to establish distinct
14. See Belli, supra note 9; see also Katches et al, supra note 9 (explaining that tissue donation
is more prevalent than organ donation because "[o]rgans can only be harvested from donors
who are brain dead but whose heart and other organs are still functioning" whereas "[t]issue still
can be recovered" within twenty-four hours after death).
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See, e.g., Bob Meadows et al., Gang of Ghouls: After Cops Smash a Body-Parts-For-Sale
Ring, a New Fear: Did Surgery Patients Get Tainted Human Tissue?, PEOPLE MAG., Mar. 13,
2006, at 117 (discussing an alleged conspiracy involving a Brooklyn funeral home and a New
Jersey-based tissue processing agency's lucrative practice of removing bones and tissues from
cadavers, including those of famed British reporter Alistair Cooke, without consent from the
family of the deceased). See also Hartt v. County of Los Angeles, No. B158539, 2003 WL
22725692 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003) (refusing to grant relief to a family whose deceased son's
cornea and lungs were donated by the coroner's office without permission from the family); see
also ANNIE CHENEY, BODY BROKERS: INSIDE AMERICA'S UNDERGROUND TRADE IN HUMAN
REMAINS (forthcoming 2006).
17. 70 Fed. Reg. 6086 (proposed Feb. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 486.342).
18. Id. at 6111 (discussing the need to take certain steps in order to ensure that families are
fully informed before making the decision to donate).
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mechanisms for securing consent for tissue retrieval from competent
individuals prior to death, and also must permit organ procurement
agencies to offer families fixed compensation in exchange for human
tissue. There is little to be feared from the introduction of such pay-
ments into the market in tissues. To the contrary, a host of legal and
ethical justifications work to transform what is a hard question in the
context of the market in human organs to a rather obvious answer in
the context of transactions in human tissue.
Part II of this Article begins with a brief overview of the tissue in-
dustry, describing the nature of the procurement process as well as the
end uses of the tissue collected from human cadavers. 19 Following
this, I turn to a critical analysis of the proposed federal regulations,
demonstrating the multiple ways in which they both fail at their task
of protecting families and pose a significant risk to the vitality of the
market in human tissue.20 My analysis exposes the legal constraints
that frame this industry, including issues ranging from private tort and
contract law to constitutional law principles such as First Amendment
concerns and autonomy rights. The final section turns to the problem
of regulating this industry, particularly the procurement process.21 I
propose that the solicitation of human tissue, unlike that of human
organs, should be treated as a market transaction in which families are
offered compensation in exchange for providing access to their loved
ones' remains.
II. THE TISSUE INDUSTRY TODAY
Tissue "donation" is surprisingly big business in light of its relatively
low profile. 22 The number of uses for human tissue, and the frequency
19. Tissue can be retrieved from live donors, as well as from cadavers. See Barbara Indech,
The International Harmonization of Human Tissue Regulation: Regulatory Control Over Human
Tissue Use and Tissue Banking in Select Countries and the Current State of International Harmo-
nization Efforts, 55 FoOD DRUG L.J. 343, 343 (2000). Tissue donations from cadavers raise more
complex issues because of the need to obtain consent from the family, rather than from the
donor.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. The term "donation" is somewhat of a euphemism in that there is a long-standing, if spo-
radic, record of the use of human body parts and tissues without consent. Historically, one sees
evidence of this in the practice of "cadaver snatching," in which predominantly African-Ameri-
can bodies were appropriated for medical study. See Goodwin, supra note 5, at 376-81. Today,
the term "donation" is rendered an oxymoron in state laws permitting the "mandatory dona-
tion" of corneas from cadavers. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 497, 477 (6th Cir. 1991),
for a successful challenge to these practices on due process grounds. See also Erik S. Jaffe, Note,
"She's Got Bette Davis['s] Eyes": Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs
Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528, 550 n.106 (1990) (discuss-
ing the history of property rights in cadavers).
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of such use, is growing exponentially. In 1990, there were 350,000
musculoskeletal transplantations using human tissue.2 3 By 2002, that
number was over 800,000.24 The following section discusses the pro-
cess by which tissue is procured and rendered, and provides an over-
view of the tissue industry.
A. The Process of Tissue Procurement and Rendering
Unlike organs, tissue can be recovered from almost any corpse up
to twenty-four hours after death.25 Thus, a far greater number of peo-
ple are potential tissue donors than organ donors. Also, because so
many different tissues can be recovered, each corpse represents scores
of potential uses. Federal law governing organ transplantation helped
to expand the supply of available tissue by requiring hospitals to no-
tify the regional Organ Procurement Organization (OPO) in the event
of a potential donor's death.26 By making requests for donation rou-
tine, these regulations had the indirect effect of enhancing the availa-
bility of tissue, as well as organs.
Although the law does not require it at the present time, only non-
profit agencies are engaged in soliciting and retrieving tissue from
human cadavers. 27 For the most part, hospitals have delegated the
solicitation process to OPO agents, who are specially trained to work
with families under these challenging circumstances. 28 Solicitation
may take place either in person-typically at the hospital-or by tele-
phone.29 Either way, solicitation must occur quickly, as the tissue
must be retrieved no later than twenty-four hours after death.
If the next of kin agree to donate, the OPO arranges for the tissue
to be recovered. Many OPOs operate as tissue banks and thus, in
addition to their work in recovering and transferring organs, are
23. Tissue Banks: The Dangers of Tainted Tissues and the Need for Federal Regulation: Hear-
ings Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement of Jesse L.
Goodman, Director, Food and Drug Administration Center for Biologics Evaluation and Re-
search), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/051403goodman.pdf.
24. Id.
25. Belli, supra note 9.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1320b-8(a)(1) (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 482.45 (2005). The regulations were ex-
panded and updated in 1998, from simply informing families of the option to donate, to actually
requiring hospitals to notify the OPO, which then makes a request for donation.
27. Telephone Interview with Thomas Mone, Chief Executive Officer, OneLegacy (Mar. 30,
2005).
28. Telephone Interview with Edward Goldman, Associate Vice President and Deputy Gen-
eral Counsel, Office of the General Counsel Health System Legal Office, University of Michigan
(Feb. 23, 2005).
29. Telephone Interview with Thomas Mone, supra note 27.
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equipped to retrieve and store human tissue.30 Others work with in-
dependent tissue banks, which will be notified of the family's consent
and will undertake the retrieval process. 3' Tissue retrieval can be
costly, as it requires not only the proper procedures for removing and
preserving the tissue but also the work of restoring the appearance of
the corpse.32
Following the removal of the tissue, the OPO will transfer the tissue
to a tissue processor, which will prepare the tissue for use by others,
whether for transplantation or for creation of a commercial product
such as AlloDerm.33 The OPO will charge the tissue processor a "rea-
sonable payment" designed to reflect the OPO's costs in retrieving
and storing the tissue. These costs vary significantly-" [a] typical do-
nor produces $14,000 to $34,000 in sales for the nonprofits .... ,
When treated and rendered transplantable by the tissue processors,
this same raw material will gain enormous value. For example,
"[s]kin, tendons, heart valves, veins and corneas are listed at about
$110,000. Add bone from the same body, and one cadaver can be
worth about $220,000." 35 These gains are realized when the tissue
processors distribute the tissues to doctors, hospitals, or other users of
their end products. Given these stakes, it was perhaps inevitable that
the symbiotic relationship between nonprofit and for-profit agencies
dealing in human tissue would generate some instances of abuse. The
following subsection describes the tissue industry and details some of
the problems that have resulted from the absence of regulation.
30. Id. Mone recommends that OPOs develop their own tissue banks, as OneLegacy has
done, so that they can "control the process, not leaving it to small rogue agencies." Id.
31. Id.
32. See Robert Ninker, Organ Donations: Should Funeral Directors Encourage It, and Should
They Be Reimbursed?, DEATH CARE Bus. ADVISOR, June 12, 1997. Ninker discussed the pains-
taking process of putting a body back together after organ and tissue retrieval:
Now we get to the funeral director, who really hasn't been a full partner in the shar-
ing of the costs for organ and tissue transplants. In fact, it is the funeral director who is
faced with the huge challenge of restoring a body that has had liberal donations taken
from it-donations that can very well include skin, the mandible, back bones, and long
bones. When a fully harvested body comes to the preparation room, the embalmer is
looking at anywhere from an additional two to 12 hours of work in order to properly
reothe remains so that thcy can be vweu at a visitation. The last thing the organ
donor organizations want is for the funeral director to charge the family for any addi-
tional work. They feel the family shouldn't have to incur any of the costs associated
with the donation, but frequently don't want to reimburse the funeral director in any
adequate way.
Id.
33. Id.
34. Katches et al., supra note 9.
35. Id.
2006]
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B. Overview of the Tissue Industry
There are myriad uses for tissue retrieved from human cadavers.
Skin grafts can be used to treat burns or can be processed into prod-
ucts that are useful for cosmetic purposes such as enhancing lip size,
reducing wrinkles, or enlarging penises. 36 Bones can be used in trans-
plantation procedures or may be processed and "[u]sed in spinal fu-
sions, to replace cancerous tissue, fill voids caused by trauma, [and]
augment prostheses .. . . 37 Heart valves and arteries may be trans-
planted. 38 Whole cadavers may be used in the training of doctors at
all levels of the profession.39 The list goes on and grows longer as
technology and ingenuity move forward.
The tissue industry is remarkably unregulated, with all manner of
participants engaged in the buying and selling of human tissue. There
is one major caveat, however: federal law prohibits "any person" from
receiving "valuable consideration" in exchange for transferring organs
and tissues.40 The law does acknowledge the costs entailed by tissue
retrieval, storage, rendering, and transplantation, and permits those
involved in these practices to charge "reasonable payments" to recipi-
ents as the tissue moves from one handler to the next.41
Thus, although the family members of donors are prohibited from
receiving payment in exchange for permitting access to their loved
ones' tissues, every other entity involved in the tissue industry, includ-
ing the ultimate consumer, pays for access to that tissue. Nor does the
law's ostensible cap on costs (reasonable costs) necessarily dictate that
only fixed, modest sums of money change hands. Indeed, the amount
of compensation paid for human tissue will vary quite dramatically
36. See Katz, supra note 11, at 965-66.
37. See Osteotech Corporate Overview, http://www.osteotech.comcorpover.htm (last visited
Sept. 21, 2005).
38. See Katz, supra note 11, at 960.
39. The use of cadavers for training purposes remains unregulated due to the government's
failure to regulate nontransplant tissue banks. Virtually anyone can set up a trade in cadavers so
long as that person does not harvest body parts for transplant. Without any federal regulation,
families who donate their loved ones' bodies are almost never informed that the bodies are sold
to middlemen or parceled out to surgical equipment companies. See Annie Cheney, The Resur-
rection Men: Scenes From the Cadaver Trade, HARPER'S MAO., Mar. 2004, at 45 (discussing how
the federal government's failure to regulate nontransplant tissue banks has lead to a cadaver
market in which bodies are dismembered and sold for medical school research and physician
training courses that take place in hotels around the nation). See also Ronald Campbell et al.,
Rough Research, ORANGE COUNrY REG., Apr. 18, 2000, available at http://www.ocregister.com/
features/body/day3.shtml (discussing how bodies donated for science "are replacing crash-test
dummies and animals in sometimes-bizarre research projects").
40. National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000).
41. Id. § 274e(c)(2).
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according to market considerations. 42 The result is that the tissue in-
dustry is definitively-indeed fabulously-profitable, generating an
estimated one billibn dollars per year.43
The potential for profit has contributed to a variety of questionable
practices. For example, the close working relationship between non-
profit and for-profit agencies dealing in human tissue has led suppliers
to favor more regular buyers, or those able to reimburse at higher
rates, over others.44 Thus, burn units complain of a shortage of skin
available for transplantation, in spite of the fact that private plastic
surgeons enjoy an ample supply for their elective surgeries. 45
Perhaps more disturbing is the recent spate of thefts reported by
families who discovered that their deceased relatives' tissue had been
stolen and sold for profit. The media has reported several instances in
which funeral parlors allegedly sold bones and other tissue to tissue
banks without having secured the permission of surviving family mem-
bers.46 The Funeral Ethics Organization, founded in the fall of 2004,
devoted the cover story of its first newsletter to the topic of the unreg-
ulated trade in body parts.47 The article's tone is quite revealing re-
garding the lack of constraints placed upon these key players in the
42. See Katz, supra note 11, at 980-84. Katz notes that the same tissue can be put to different
uses, some of which are more lucrative than others. See generally id. For example, processors
can charge surgeons four times more for skin products than they charge to burn centers. See
Katches et al., supra note 9.
43. The extent of profits now generated through the use of a product seemingly protected
from exploitation under federal law can be seen by considering the example of AlloDerm, the
leading product made by LifeCell, Inc. LifeCell is a for-profit corporation that developed Al-
loDerm in 1992 in order to help reconstruct burn victims' skin following skin grafts. By the late
1990s, this product had been adopted for widespread use not only in the treatment of burn
victims but also for use by cosmetic surgeons. The latter clientele is capable of paying far greater
sums of money for AlloDerm and generates ten times the level of revenue as burn centers.
William Heisel et al., Lives on the Line, ORANGE CouNTY REG., Apr. 17, 2000, available at http:/
/www.ocregister.com/featuresfbody/day2.shtml. Industry analysts pay tribute to the extraordi-
nary profitability of LifeCell's stock, attributed to the demand for AlloDerm. They note that by
2005, AlloDerm accounted for seventy-five percent of LifeCell's sales; less than ten percent of
which went to treating burn victims. BI Research, LifeCell Corp., http://www.biresearch.coml
sample0505.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). In 2005, AlloDerm earned $93.3 million; its pro-
jected earnings for 2006 are between $124 and $130 million. HealthpointCapital, LifeCell Re-
ports Preliminary 4Q:05 Financials, http://www.healthpointcapital.com/research/2006/01/26/
lifecell reportspreliminary 4q05_financias/index-ph- (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
44. See generally Heisel et al., supra note 43.
45. See id. (explaining that skin is in high supply for plastic surgeons because they are willing
to pay the going rate and they are always buying). Skin for burn victims is in short supply due to
the smaller marketplace and a lower profit margin. Id. The potential revenue from providing
skin for burn victims is estimated at one tenth of the plastic surgery market. Id.
46. Meadows et al., supra note 16. See also Hartt v. County of Los Angeles, No. B158539,
2003 WL 22725692 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2003); CHENEY, supra note 16.
47. See Lisa Carlson, Body Parts: An Unregulated Business, in FUNERAL ETHICS ORGANIZA-
TION (Fall Newsletter, 2004), available at http://www.funeralethics.org/fall-04.pdf.
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market in human tissue. For instance, after discussing the existence of
a black market in human tissue, it asks whether it is an ethical di-
lemma for a funeral director to "accept a commissi6n, a finder's fee or
a 'donation"' in exchange for procuring human tissue.48 Although the
negative ethical and policy implications of engaging in such a practice
are self-evident, the author did not attempt to answer this apparently
challenging ethical dilemma.
A less sensational yet arguably broader and more problematic con-
sequence of the lucrative nature of the market in human tissue has
been the emergence of a variety of alliances and exclusive partner-
ships between for-profit tissue processors and nonprofit tissue banks
in order to stabilize or increase their supply needs. 49 These partner-
ships allow nonprofit agencies to produce private lines of tissue for the
specific purpose of processing, marketing, and distributing the product
under for-profit labels. 50 In the most disturbing instances, for-profit
tissue processors are actually establishing nonprofit tissue supply
banks.51 For example, RTI, a for-profit tissue processor, formed RTI
Donor Servies, Inc., a non-profit tissue bank. This network of inter-
connected relationships obscures the lines between nonprofit and for-
profit tissue agencies.52
A word about the distinction between nonprofit and for-profit enti-
ties is in order here. Although all OPOs are organized as nonprofit
businesses, tissue processors may be either nonprofit or for-profit en-
tities.53 The line between nonprofits and for-profit entities, however,
should not be overstated. The distinction between nonprofit and for-
profit is little more than semantic when it comes to the existence of a
market, complete with profit incentives, in human tissue. As Profes-
sor Julia Mahoney noted:
Refusing to employ the language of commerce disguises the fact
that when human tissue is transferred from a lower value user to a
higher value user, additional value is created. Such transfers will
result not only in invaluable medical treatment and ground breaking
research, but also in economic benefits to whatever entities are em-
48. Id. at 1.
49. See Katz, supra note 11, at 961-65. See also Katches et al., supra note 9.
50. See Katz, supra note 11, at 967. For example, Allosource, a nonprofit, produces a private
line of products for Interpore Cross International, a for-profit medical device company. Id.
51. See id. at 1225.
52. See generally Katches et al., supra note 9. For a thorough discussion of the nature of this
phenomenon and the challenges for those seeking to design appropriate legal regulations for the
relationships between the nonprofit and the for-profit sectors of the tissue industry, see Katz,
supra note 11.
53. See Katz, supra note 11, at 944.
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powered to capture the surplus. This is true whether the institutions
involved are for-profit firms or nonprofit institutions. 54
To be sure, for-profit businesses are structured with the goal of gener-
ating profit, and toward that end, they have owners who exercise vary-
ing degrees of control over the enterprise and who are entitled to a
share in the revenue it produces. Nonprofit firms do not have owners,
nor do those who help to run these businesses receive a share of the
firm's net revenue.55 That being said, it is also true that "[m]any non-
profit firms, including many that provide health care services, engage
in profit-making activities and are operated to maximize revenue,
while numerous for-profit firms make charitable contributions. In a
number of sectors of the economy, including healthcare services, non-
profit and for-profit firms coexist and compete. '56
In the context of the human tissue industry, the line between non-
profit and for-profit entities is particularly nebulous. This blurriness is
due to the overlapping, or even incestuous, alliances forged between
nonprofit and for-profit tissue-banking and processing agencies. In
part, these alliances help to secure a stable supply for those who draw
upon the human tissue industry. For instance, tissue banks might have
contracts with for-profit entities because the nonprofit institutions,
such as burn centers, have irregular and sporadic needs for tissue.57
The tissue bank therefore sells tissue to both entities, simply charging
more money to the for-profit firms who seek tissue for elective, cos-
metic enhancement procedures, and less money to burn units.58
III. MOVEMENT TOWARD REGULATION: THE
DISCLOSURE SOLUTION
The growing publicity surrounding the increasing abuses of the
human tissue trade has highlighted the need for greater regulation of
the tissue industry.59 At first, many within the tissue industry resisted
the call for regulation. 60 They noted that the most egregious of abuse
cases involved only a few rogue players within the industry61 and ex-
54. Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 192-93 (2000).
55. David A. Shevlin, Threshold Issues in Forming or Reorganizing a New York Not-For-Profit
Organization, in ADVISING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION (PLI Tax L. & Estate Planning. Course
Handbook Series No. 2783, 2004) (defining nonprofits as "organization[s] organized under the
applicable state law as a corporation, trust or unincorporated association for purposes other than
distributing income and profits to private owners").
56. Mahoney, supra note 54, at 193 n.122.
57. See Heisel et al., supra note 43.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., supra note 16 and accompanying text.
60. Telephone Interview with Thomas Mone, supra note 27.
61. Id.
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pressed concern that the solution of requiring greater disclosure to
families at the point of solicitation would have negative consequences
for the entire industry. 62 In essence, they made two justifications for
the status quo. First, in the aftermath of the death of a loved one,
families were too traumatized to take in a full disclosure regarding the
corporate organization and possible downstream uses of tissue. The
moment of solicitation was, in short, the wrong time to be informing
families of the fact that some small percentage of the tissue they do-
nate might ultimately be processed by for-profit entities who would
sell the products they made from it for use in cosmetic procedures. 63
Their second concern was that, to the extent that families were fully
informed, they would be less willing to donate. 64 Therefore, the impo-
sition of disclosure requirements threatened the viability of the entire
organ and tissue transplant industry.... -
The federal government was not persuaded by these concerns, and
in February 2005 it proposed regulations mandating that donors be
given the opportunity to make an "informed consent" to donation.65
Under the heading "Informed Consent," the proposed regulations
provide:
[T]his section would require that an OPO have a written protocol to
ensure that the individual(s) making the donation decision for each
potential organ donor is informed of their options to donate organs
and tissues .... The OPO would have to provide to the individ-
ual(s) making the donation decision, at a minimum, the following:
(1) A list of the organs, tissues, or eyes to be recovered,
(2) All possible uses for the donated organs and/or tissues,
(3) The information that the individual(s) have the right to limit
or restrict use of the organs or tissues,
(5) Information (such as profit or non-profit status) about orga-
nizations that will recover, process, and distribute tissue . ... 66
The disclosure solution inherent in these proposed regulations pre-
supposes a clarity and consensus about the problem with nondisclo-
sure. In actuality, one might identify at least three aspects of
nondisclosure in the present, unregulated solicitation process. First,
62. See Katches et al., supra note 9. Leaders in the tissue industry say that "donations would
plummet if families" were informed about the profitable market for donated tissue. Id. Jan
Pierce, Director of the Intermountain Tissue Center, stated frankly: "If donors were told at the
time about profits, they wouldn't donate . I..." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Telephone Interview with Thomas Mone, supra note 27.
64. Id.
65. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Conditions for Coverage for Organ Procurement
Organizations (OPOs), 70 Fed. Reg. 6086, 6119 (proposed Feb. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 486.342).
66. Id.
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the most obvious nondisclosure problem lies in the fraudulent claims
made by those who assure donors that their loved ones' tissue will be
used for "medical" or "life-saving" purposes. Such assurances are
misleading at best, as they omit reference to the use of donated tissue
in purely elective cosmetic procedures. The proposed regulations
would guard against this most blatant fraud. But the risks of fraud in
the solicitation of tissue go well beyond this narrow concern, as is rec-
ognized by the scope of these proposed regulations.
A broader risk of fraud lies in the problem of delineating the possi-
ble end uses of donated tissue. For instance, one might believe that
cosmetic surgery is a relatively frivolous endeavor and that donors
might be disinclined to make a gift of their loved ones' tissue if they
knew that it would be used to enhance the puffiness of someone's lips
or penis. Thus, the proposed regulations require disclosure of "[a]ll
possible uses" for the donated tissue.67
A third nondisclosure concern pertains to the monetary gains asso-
ciated with a tissue's use. Unlike donated organs, donated tissue
likely will pass through the hands of several agencies en route to its
use in transplantation.68 Some of these agencies may operate on a for-
profit basis, generating considerable revenue. 69 The government dem-
onstrates its awareness of this risk by proposing the disclosure of the
for-profit or nonprofit status of all recipient organizations. 70
Given that the proposed regulations reveal the government's
awareness of and concern with a much broader set of nondisclosure
risks than those triggered by misleading donors into believing that the
tissue will save lives, it is vital to question the extent to which these
regulations, as drafted, are likely to accomplish the government's goal
of fully informing donors about the nature of the gift that they are
asked to make. In the following section, I will explain why the pro-
posed regulations fail to meet the goals of a full and meaningful dis-
closure. Furthermore, I will explore the regulatory challenge inherent
in the goal of creating such disclosure, including First Amendment
limitations, and the likely market implications of a more robust
disclosure.
67. Id. at 6111.
68. See Katz, supra note 11, at 959-60 (discussing the tissue retrieval and processing
procedure).
69. See generally Katches et al., supra note 9.
70. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 6119.
2006] 915
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
IV. WHY THE TRUTH Is NOT ENOUGH
The proposed federal regulations requiring specific disclosures by
those soliciting donations of tissue from the families of the deceased
mark an important step toward remedying what is a persistent threat,
if not a commonplace practice-fraud. Specifically, donor families are
defrauded when those soliciting tissue vaguely suggest that a donation
would "save or enhance lives" without adding that it might just as
easily be sold to a for-profit corporation and used in cosmetic sur-
gery.71 My concern is that, for a host of reasons, mere disclosure is
not enough to remedy the family's vulnerability to exploitation by so-
licitors of human tissue donations. Moreover, there is a considerable
risk that disclosure, by itself, will have a negative impact on the entire
organ and tissue industry, chilling the willingness to donate, and thus
constricting an already limited supply of organs and tissue.
The following section will identify and elaborate on four concerns
that highlight the residual vulnerability of donor families and the addi-
tional problems generated for the organ and tissue industry under the
current disclosure regulations. First, I will discuss the First Amend-
ment tensions that may preclude the law from mandating a truly full
disclosure. Second, I will note the potential threat that disclosure,
whether full or partial, poses to the organ and transplant industry's
ability to cultivate the public's trust. Third, I will discuss the barriers
that may hinder the development of an efficient market response to
the problems that are likely to be generated in the wake of greater
disclosure. Finally, I will explore the legal considerations, both sub-
stantive and procedural, that render problematic, if not unconsciona-
ble, the agreements made between families and OPO agents.
A. The First Amendment and the Regulation of Charitable
Solicitations: How Much Truth Will Donors Receive?
It seems obvious that organ procurement agents should be required
to make a full disclosure of their status and of the possible uses to
which donations of human tissue may be put when soliciting donations
from families of the deceased. Yet making the law conform to this
expectation is surprisingly challenging because two lines of cases trig-
ger concerns relevant to the act of regulating the solicitation of dona-
tions. The first are cases protecting the charities' First Amendment
71. See Katches et al., supra note 9 ("Families are led to believe they are giving the gift of life.
They are not told that skin goes to enlarge penises or smooth out wrinkles, or that executives of
tissue banks . . . routinely earn six-figure salaries. The products are rarely life-saving as
advertised.").
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rights to free speech, and the second are cases protecting vulnerable
individuals from predatory behavior by limiting the time, place, and
manner of solicitation. Once one situates tissue solicitation at the in-
tersection of these two well-established legal concerns, it is relatively
easy to see why the proposed regulations require disclosure. I there-
fore begin this section with a brief discussion of how the law should
regard the role played by organ procurement agents in soliciting tissue
donations.
1. The Organ Procurement Agent as Solicitor
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to requiring full disclosure in tissue so-
licitations stems from the manner in which those working in the tissue
industry see and successfully portray themselves to others. Despite
the fact that organ procurement agents (those who solicit donations)
work on behalf of the organ and tissue procurement industry, they do
not necessarily view themselves as agents for this industry.72 This has
led to some confusion about the nature and the extent of disclosure
that they should make.
Organ procurement agents have a job that is rife with emotional
challenge. They have the difficult task of approaching grieving fami-
lies to request that they donate parts of their loved ones' bodies to
others. The agents never really see or meet the "fruits" of their la-
bor-the recipients of the donated organs or tissue who are thereby
permitted the chance to live fuller, healthier, and in some cases,
longer lives. Their training focuses heavily on cultivating the appro-
priate manner in which to solicit the families of the deceased. It is
therefore not surprising that these agents view themselves as working
on behalf of these families as the families move into the process of
mourning. Indeed, as Thomas Mone, the CEO of OneLegacy, the na-
tion's largest OPO, commented:
The OPO staff does feel that they're there first for the donor's fam-
ily. Fifty of the nation's fifty-eight OPOs are not tied to transplant
centers. The staff never sees recipients; indeed, they spend all of
their time with donors, hospital staff, and families in hospitals.
Partly this is for strategic reasons, but also it is because of their de-
s...t...... hel SUtJL5 good come out of..ag-y. It's not al" about
the recipients .... This is what drives the personalities of these
folks.7s
The federal regulations embrace the notion that the agents who so-
licit organ and tissue donations are somehow acting on behalf of the
72. Interview with Thomas Mone, supra note 27.
73. Id.
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donor families. The subtitle for this section of the regulations reads
"Informed Consent." 74 Informed consent is a doctrine borrowed from
the context of medical treatment, wherein a doctor must act as a fidu-
ciary for his or her patient, helping to guide the patient in making
treatment decisions. 75 It is a reflection of the reality that patients lack
the information they need to make their own treatment decisions, and
as such, must rely upon their doctors to look out for their best inter-
ests. Informed consent is the hallmark of what differentiates the doc-
tor-patient relationship from a standard arm's length transaction in
which both parties are free to act in their own self-interest.76
The informed consent paradigm is misplaced in the context of the
solicitation of human tissue. There are no fiduciaries in transactions
involving the solicitation of human tissue from families of the de-
ceased. No matter how sensitively they solicit donations, OPO agents
are just that-employees of the OPO. These agents are not fiducia-
ries for the families of the deceased. Even if their solicitations occur
in the hospital, gaining a family's consent to a donation is not akin to
gaining a patient's consent to treatment. Doctors obtain informed
consent from their patients, disclosing the risks and benefits of a pro-
posed course of action, because their patients have no other choice
but to rely upon them as fiduciaries. There is no similar reliance be-
tween the OPO agent and the bereaved family. Quite the contrary-
the OPO's loyalties do not lie with the family. The OPO agent is em-
ployed by the OPO for the purpose of securing gifts from family mem-
bers. They are fundraisers, soliciting a donation for their
organizations. 77
The more appropriate framework for conceptualizing the relation-
ship between the OPO agent and the family of the deceased is that of
charitable solicitations. The OPO agent, acting on behalf of a non-
profit charitable organization, approaches the family with a request
for a donation. Although there are important ways in which the solici-
tation of tissue donations differs from the more typical, charitable so-
licitation of financial support, generally speaking the relationship
between the OPO agent and the donor's family fits squarely within
74. See 70 Fed. Reg. at 6119.
75. Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors' Orders: Unmasking the Doctor's Fiduciary Role
in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 451, 455-56 & n.19 (2000).
76. See id.
77. Those who care for the dying-perhaps the most familiar with the solicitation process-
tell of some OPO agents who hover near the doors of the hospital rooms of dying patients,
waiting for the chance to solicit organ and tissue donations from family members. Interview with
Margaret Eaton, Senior Research Scholar, Stanford Center for Biomedical Ethics (Dec. 5, 2005).
Clearly, such behavior is not consistent with the notion of fiduciary duty.
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the framework of solicitation for charitable purposes. As such, it is
important to understand the extent to which the law regulates such
solicitations and the reasons why the law likely will preclude the gov-
ernment from demanding rigorous disclosure by OPO agents.
2. The Regulation of Charitable Solicitations: The "Trilogy" and Its
Legacy
Once one understands that the request for tissue donations is sim-
ply a species of charitable solicitation, any effort to regulate such so-
licitation must take into account the law governing the free speech
rights of charities. As Professor Leslie Espinoza documented in her
article, Straining the Quality of Mercy: Abandoning the Quest for In-
formed Giving, charities first incorporated and began to employ vigor-
ous fundraising practices in the mid-twentieth century.78 The status of
charities as corporations, rather than trusts, led to complicated strug-
gles over the regulation of these entities, in particular over the extent
to which states could exercise oversight by reviewing things such as a
charity's investments or compensation.7 9 By the end of the 1950s, the
public outcry against charities' in-person and telephone solicitation
tactics curtailed this debate and led state and local governments to
articulate regulations aimed at monitoring solicitors.80
One of the most common ways in which state and local govern-
ments have sought to regulate solicitors is to target for-profit entities
that solicit on behalf of nonprofit charities, retaining a large portion of
the revenues they raise for their own corporations.81 This particular
practice is a popular target of lawmakers in part because of the con-
cern that donors may mistakenly believe that their donations will en-
rich only the charity, rather than being used in some (often large) part
to generate revenue for a private corporation working on behalf of
their charity. 82 These regulations are relevant to solicitations made
directly by nonprofit charities (including OPOs) in that they raise the
issue of the extent to which the government can compel solicitors to
make specific disclosures when approaching prospective donors.
78. Leslie G. Espi za, Straining, the QuaN....y o Mercy: Abanduning ihe Quest for informed
Charitable Giving, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 643 (1991).
79. Id. at 642-43.
80. Id. at 643.
81. See id.
82. The political coalition supporting the targeting of for-profit "professional" fundraisers is
quite interesting. As Espinoza notes, these regulations were supported by established U.S. char-
ities seeking to eliminate competition from smaller charities that lacked the resources to raise
funds on their own. See id.
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In a series of cases dating back to 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court has
carefully delimited the extent to which state and local governments
can compel disclosures by those who solicit on behalf of charitable
entities. Specifically, beginning with Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens
for a Better Environment, the Court has rejected laws that sought to
preclude solicitation by those retaining more than a specific percent-
age of revenues.8 3 In later cases, the Court rejected a more flexible
statute that permitted solicitation by fundraisers retaining more than
twenty-five percent of revenues if the charity could prove that such
limitation would, in effect, prevent it from raising funds. 84 Finally, the
Court rejected a statute designed to protect the public from fraud by
requiring, among other things, that those soliciting disclose their fun-
draising costs at the time of their solicitation.85 In all three of these
cases, which are often referred to as the "trilogy, ' 86 the Court opined
that the speech of the solicitors was not purely commercial and there-
fore was entitled to First Amendment protection.87
In 2003, the Court decided the case of Madigan v. Telemarketing
Associates, which addressed whether the law offers any protection to
naive donors. 88 Madigan involved a claim by the Illinois Attorney
General that solicitors on behalf of VietNow, a charity that benefits
veterans, fraudulently misled donors by asserting that "a significant
amount" of each dollar went to services for veterans when, in fact,
fifteen cents or less of each dollar was received by VietNow, and of
which, only three cents would be used for services.89 In its defense,
the charity contended that "the statements made by [Telemarketers]
. . . are alleged to be 'false' only because [Telemarketers] retained
83. Viii. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (declaring unconsti-
tutional an ordinance that conditioned the grant of solicitation permits upon proof that the char-
itable organization used at least seventy-five percent of the money).
84. Sec'y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (declaring that significant
fundraising activity is protected by the First Amendment and holding that the percentage limita-
tion in the state statute was unconstitutionally overbroad).
85. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (finding unconstitutional for failure
to narrowly tailor a state law prohibiting professional fundraisers from retaining an "unreasona-
ble" or "excessive" fee). The Court did note in dicta that a state might require a solicitor to
disclose his or her "professional status" as an employee of a company making solicitations on
behalf of a charity. Id. at 799 n.11. It is not at all clear that members of the public would
understand this to mean that only a small percentage of their contribution will reach the charity.
Thus, unless the prospective donor asks what percentage of the donation will go to the charity,
this information need not be revealed.
86. Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs. Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 614 (2003).
87. See Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. at 632; see also Riley, 487 U.S. at 788;
Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 960.
88. Telemarketing Associates, 538 U.S. 600.
89. Id. at 607 n.1.
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85% of the gross receipts and failed to disclose this information to
donors." 90 Thus, they claimed that the state was attempting to regu-
late them based upon a percentage-rate limitation, which is impermis-
sible under the trilogy.91 The Court rejected that position and held
that "[s]o long as the emphasis is on what the fundraisers misleadingly
convey, and not on percentage limitations on solicitors' fees per se,
such actions need not impermissibly chill protected speech. '92 Thus, it
is clear that charitable solicitations must be made in accord with state
laws against fraud.
The practical result of this framework for regulating charitable so-
licitations is that donors are protected only insofar as the state can
prove that a solicitor's actions amounted to misrepresentation. 93 In so
doing, the Court has endorsed what Professor Espinoza termed "a
new form of caveat emptor.' '94 Under the "giver beware" model, do-
nors are expected to be sophisticated benefactors, scrutinizing any
available information, such as the Internal Revenue Service's public
records of an institution's financial status, prior to making a contribu-
tion.95 As Kent Wittrock suggested in his Note on the Madigan case,
"[I]t is unrealistic to expect donors to seek out financial information
and make donation decisions according to this information. Equally
unrealistic is the suggestion that a donor protect him or herself
through self-education when it is the donor's very generosity that per-
mits continuous solicitation. ' 96 The burden on donors becomes par-
ticularly acute when one considers the context in which OPO agents
solicit donations of human tissue.
3. Striking the First Amendment Balance in the Context of Tissue
Solicitation
Seen in the context of the law's resistance to requiring solicitors to
disclose their revenue sharing arrangements, the proposed federal reg-
ulations governing the solicitation of human tissue are relatively rigor-
ous. Solicitors must disclose all possible uses of the tissue, as well as
90. Id. at 610 (citing the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Ryan v. Telemarketing Associates,
Inc., 763 N.E.2d 289, 297 (I11. 2002)) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See id.
92. Id. at 619.
93. See id. at 613 (explaining that the state's legitimate interest in preventing misrepresenta-
tion is better served by the use of the penal laws than by prohibiting solicitation generally).
94. Espinoza, supra note 78, at 669.
95. Id.
96. Kent D. Wittrock, Note, The End of Fraudulent Solicitation-Really?: The Supreme Court
in Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates Provides That Fraudulent Statements in Charitable Solic-
itation Are Not Protected Speech, 72 UMKC L. REv. 275, 287-88 (2003) (internal citations
omitted).
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the fact that recipients may include for-profit entities. 97 They must
further inform donors of their right to restrict their donations so that
certain uses or certain recipients may be set off-limits.98 It remains to
be seen whether representatives of the tissue industry will challenge
these regulations as too restrictive of their First Amendment rights.
Certainly, the for-profit sector of this industry has much to fear from
mandatory disclosure. At the very least, it seems likely that full dis-
closure will constrict the supply of available tissue. Moreover, as I
discuss below, the ability of the for-profit tissue industry to enhance
its access to tissue may be limited, as the solution of offering to pay
donors for tissue is impermissible under current laws. 99 Thus, the chil-
ling effect that these regulations likely will have on the willingness to
donate may lead to challenges against these regulations.
Toward that end, it is useful to explore the extent to which these
regulations are able to withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment.
In this section, I will consider only the extent to which the substance
of the proposed regulations is unduly burdensome in its scope. I
demonstrate that contemporary jurisprudence not only supports the
scope of the present regulations, but indeed would seem to demand a
more extensive disclosure than presently proposed. In this subsection,
I will discuss the extent to which a more rigorous disclosure is likely to
accomplish the goals of protecting the public from fraud, as well as the
practical implications of a more thorough disclosure on the tissue in-
dustry and tissue transplantation practices as a whole.
Those engaged in the retrieval and processing of human tissue
might object to the government's proposed regulations by arguing that
they impermissibly limit free speech rights. The Supreme Court has
recently held that even when for-profit agents are soliciting on behalf
of a nonprofit charity, their speech is only partially commercial in na-
ture and is therefore protected under the doctrine of free speech. 100
The Court has found that the educational or advocacy mission of the
solicitor triggers this protection, and as such, the government's desire
to protect the public from fraud is not sufficient in and of itself to
permit it to impose disclosure requirements upon solicitors. 101 In-
97. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Conditions for Coverage for Organ Procurement
Organizations, 70 Fed. Reg. 6086, 6119 (proposed Feb. 4, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
486.342).
98. Id.
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2000) (prohibiting the sale of "kidney, liver, heart, lung, pancreas,
bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, and skin or any subpart thereof").
100. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs. Inc., 538 U.S. 600 (2003).
101. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 801 (1988) (asserting that the state's power to
constrain fundraisers must be weighed against First Amendment rights).
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stead, the goal of protection from fraud must be balanced against the
charities' First Amendment rights. 102 Thus, the regulations must be
narrowly tailored to the state interest in preventing fraud and must
not be unduly burdensome on the charities' right to free speech. 103
In the case of the solicitation of human tissue, it is clear that the
purpose behind the new regulations is to uphold the government's in-
terest in protecting the families from fraud. The open question is
whether the mandatory disclosure rules are an unduly burdensome
means of protecting the public from fraud. The industry might readily
argue that these regulations are indeed unduly burdensome on its free
speech rights. As drafted, the proposed tissue regulations' disclosure
provisions are significantly more detailed than those state and local
regulations previously ruled unconstitutional by the Court. Moreover,
to the extent that the mandatory disclosures are time-consuming and
result in a decreased supply of tissue, the industry might argue that the
regulations have a negative impact upon a charity's ability to perform
its mission.104 Even a cursory review of this argument reveals it to be
implausible. It seems absurd to argue that disclosure should not be
required because, when it is, donors revise their preferences. The very
fact that donors behave differently would attest to the materiality of
the information disclosed. The proposed regulations therefore might
be defended on the grounds that they are consistent with state com-
mon law governing fraud. This defense did not work in the trilogy
cases because there was little or no evidence linking the high fundrais-
ing costs of professional solicitors to a higher likelihood of fraud.10 5
Thus, the Court found that banning solicitation by those with high
fundraising costs, or even mandating disclosure of those costs, would
not necessarily diminish fraud.106 Instead, by inviting the public to
make the inference that high costs equate to fraud, the regulations
impermissibly prejudiced the public against charities that used the ser-
vices of professional fundraisers.
In the case of tissue solicitation, by contrast, nondisclosure, or even
partial disclosure, is almost certain to mislead prospective donors.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 800.
104. One study done in New Jersey revealed that thirty-three percent of those surveyed be-
lieve that the use of donated tissue "should be restricted to treatment of disease and injury." See
Eagleton Inst. of Pol., Ctr. for Pub. Interest Polling, New Jerseyans' Opinions on Organ and
Tissue Donation, at 7 (Feb. 2001).
105. See, e.g., Sec'y of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 966 (1984) (holding that
there is no nexus between the percentage of funds retained by the fundraiser and the likelihood
that the solicitation is fraudulent).
106. Id. at 967.
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Recall that the risks of fraud in this context include nondisclosure of
the potentially offensive end uses of the tissue and a failure to note
the extent to which the donation works to enhance the wealth of a for-
profit enterprise. By mandating the disclosure of information pertain-
ing to the possible uses and users of donated human tissue, the law
enlightens donors, enabling them to make more informed choices
about whether and how to donate.
Ironically, the more compelling argument for the tissue industry is
that the disclosures mandated by the proposed regulations do not go
far enough, and therefore are equally likely to generate prejudice as
are disclosures pertaining to high fundraising costs. For instance,
merely disclosing that donated tissue might be sold to a for-profit
company fails to convey the fact that these for-profit industries create
products that are vital to many medically necessary and compelling
treatments.10 7 Thus, without an extremely lengthy explanation by the
soliciting agent, a bald statement that some tissue might go to for-
profit entities risks generating a distorted image of the range of uses
of donated tissue.10 8
Therefore, one might argue that the proposed regulations require
too little disclosure, and that the only way to protect the public from
fraud, while simultaneously guarding against the risk of prejudicial in-
ferences being drawn from the disclosure of information pertaining to
the end uses and users of donated tissue, is to require an even more
thorough disclosure than is presently mandated by federal regulations.
This disclosure would include a discussion of the range of for-profit
entities who work with human tissue, the variety of ways in which they
might use or distribute this tissue, and the nature of the treatments for
which such tissue routinely is used.
Mandating such a thorough disclosure would be unprecedented in
the context of charitable solicitations, and it clearly escalates the im-
pingement upon the First Amendment rights of the soliciting agency.
It is not, however, radical. Indeed, even a brief review of the law gov-
erning fraud and misrepresentation reveals that solicitors owe poten-
tial donors nothing less. Support for a more rigorous disclosure may
107. For example, CryoLife Inc. is a for-profit company making sixty million dollars per year
predominately by freezing heart valves for later use in life-saving surgeries. See Tissue Supply,
Demand Make for Odd Alliances, ORANGE CouNTry REG., Apr. 16, 2000, available at http://
www.ocregister.com/features/body/daylwho.shtml. See also Heisel et al., supra note 43 (dis-
cussing the life-saving uses for Alloderm such as filling holes made by tumors, providing slings
for Weak bladders, and providing new skin to burn victims).
108. The negative implications for the for-profit industry are particularly troubling in light of
the nebulous distinction between the for-profit and the nonprofit sectors of the tissue market.
See supra Part lI.B.
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be found in the law of securities, wherein the half-truth rule treats as
an affirmative misrepresentation a statement in which a "partial dis-
closure of facts [is] literally correct but misleading in light of facts that
are concealed ...."109
More generally, support also is found in the common law governing
misrepresentation. Consider, for example, § 161 of the Second Re-
statement of Contracts:
A person's non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to
an assertion that the fact does not exist in the following cases only:
(a) where he knows that disclosure of the fact is necessary to pre-
vent some previous assertion from being a misrepresentation
or from being fraudulent or material,
(b) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a
mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which
that party is making the contract .... 11o
As already noted, those who solicit tissue donations are not acting as
fiduciaries, protecting the interests of those asked to donate.'11 Nor
are the solicitors acting altruistically. Instead, they seek to induce the
donors to enter into a transaction that will be altruistic on the donors'
part. This is a classic arm's length transaction. To the extent that so-
licitors of human tissue remain silent about the full range of uses to
which a tissue donation may be put, they are misrepresenting material
facts. As a result, their silence arguably precludes the formation of a
contract. 12 The "contracts" they procure by virtue of their silence
should be voidable, if not completely void.
As such, although it is unprecedented in the context of charitable
solicitations, requiring a comprehensive disclosure is not legally prob-
lematic; indeed, it is legally mandated. Instead, the problem with such
a proposal is practical in nature. Even if one imagines the most sensi-
tive of agents, it is painful to imagine the process by which he or she
will lead the recently bereaved family through a rigorous disclosure.
109. See Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Inexorable March Toward a Continuous Disclosure Re-
quirement for Publicly Traded Corporations: "Are We There Yet?," 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 135,
143-44 (1998).
110. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 (1981).
iii. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 163-64 (1981). This assumes that the
misrepresentation pertains to the essential terms of the proposed contract and that the donor
lacked reasonable opportunity to verify the accuracy of those terms. Plainly, information per-
taining to the end uses of one's gift is an essential term of the proposed contract and, given the
delicate nature of the timing of such solicitations, it is unreasonable to expect donors to investi-
gate such end uses on their own. Even if a court finds that the contract is not void, it should find
these agreements voidable at the insistence of a donor who can show that the agreement was
induced by the solicitor's misrepresentation.
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It is this consideration that frames my broader set of concerns with the
proposed regulations.
V. THOROUGH DISCLOSURE'S POTENTIAL DOWNSIDES
Although I have argued that the law supports mandating a robust
disclosure when soliciting tissue from families of the deceased, it is my
belief that this solution will not fully remedy the risk that families will
be misled, and more importantly, is likely to give rise to a host of
problematic consequences. In this section, I will discuss three such
consequences: undermining public trust in transplantation, constrict-
ing the supply of tissue available for transplantation, and exacerbating
legal problems regarding the timing and nature of tissue solicitation. I
will conclude that not only is disclosure not enough to protect the
public from fraud, but insofar as it is offered in isolation, it poses a
significant threat to the viability of the tissue transplantation industry,
and perhaps even to the broader organ transplantation as well.
A. Thorough Disclosure's Potential Threat to Organ and
Tissue Solicitation
For years, the tissue procurement industry has resisted pressure to
mandate more thorough disclosure to families during the solicitation
process, claiming that such disclosure might have a negative impact
upon the family's willingness to donate.113 Although this justification
for resisting disclosure has been offered without elaboration and is
rather easy to reject, it is nonetheless important to explore, if only
briefly, the potential threat that full disclosure might pose to the organ
and tissue procurement industry as a whole in the absence of any
other incentives to donate.
In essence, the threat raised by a thorough disclosure is as follows.
The agent seeking the donation would be forced to tell the donor fam-
ily that the tissue from their loved one's body could be used by a host
of different intermediaries, who would render it useful to people with
maladies ranging from burns to heart disease to bone loss to small
penises to thin lips. Upon hearing this, in addition to feeling over-
whelmed by the amount of information they have been asked to ab-
sorb, the families might start to feel somewhat uncomfortable about
giving away parts of their loved ones' bodies.114 On one hand, it
might be nice to help those in need. On the other hand, there are so
many players in this industry, all standing to benefit (if not to profit)
113. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 104.
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by using the tissue they donate. Even if the families do not start feel-
ing resentful about being asked to make a gift to this industry, they
might be a bit repulsed by the realization that the solicitor is not there
to comfort them, but rather to gain access to their loved ones' bodies.
There is an extensive literature considering the problem of organ
shortages in this country. Most authors seem to blame the shortage
on the distrust of doctors, and indeed of the healthcare system in gen-
eral, that is felt in particular by certain already subordinated sectors of
the population.115 It seems that there is a strong association between
lack of access to the healthcare system and refusal to donate organs.' 16
Some suspect that this association reflects the concerns of minority
populations, such as African Americans, that their organs will not be
used to benefit other African Americans. 117 Others suggest that the
problem is more general-those who have been excluded from the
healthcare system for most or all of their lives may have little reason
to want to support that system upon their deaths. 118 Either way, a
solicitation for a donation that includes detailed information about the
end uses of human tissue by for-profit agencies seems likely to add
fuel to this particular fire.
A thorough disclosure regarding the potential uses and users of
donated tissue may intensify the distrust felt by some toward the en-
tire organ and tissue transplantation enterprise. Those who are con-
fused or alarmed when approached-within hours of losing their
loved one with a request that they donate the body to this complicated
industry-might understandably refuse altogether, rather than taking
the time to identify which parts they are inclined to give and to whom.
Thus, a rigorous disclosure surrounding tissue transplantation might
play into the pre-existing problem of distrust, thereby further con-
stricting not only the nation's supply of human tissue, but also to its
supply of solid organs. Moreover, the most obvious way to combat
this risk is to provide an even more thorough explanation to the pro-
spective donors about the differences between the organ and the tis-
sue transplant industries. Given the timing of these solicitations,
however, this course of action may be impractical. 119 Moreover, it is
115. See Goodwin, supra note 5, at 312.
116. Id. (stating that "African Americans demonstrate a diminished or guarded willingness to
participate in the present altruistic system").
117. Id. ("Their [African Americans'] concerns are well-documented in the literature: mis-
trust of the medical profession, and doubts that their organs will be used to benefit other African
Americans.").
118. Id.
119. Of course, it is possible for a donor to consent to the donation of an organ while refusing
to donate tissue. Indeed, at least some OPOs already use separate consent forms or separate
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likely to make the tissue industry look not just different, but bad by
comparison. This leads to my third concern with the disclosure
solution.
B. Disclosure's Potential Impact on Tissue Supply
The disclosure regulations presuppose that donors are interested in
knowing whether the recipients are nonprofit organizations, as op-
posed to for-profit corporations. Indeed, presumably donors will be
more than merely interested in knowing this information-one as-
sumes that they will be less likely to give away their loved ones' tissue
to those who will be using it to make a profit.120 This would seem to
be highly rational on their part, as one of the basic laws of transactions
between humans is that "you cannot get something for nothing."112' If
the for-profit companies are getting "something" from the families
(and, of course, all available information suggests that they are), then
the rational donor will no longer perceive himself or herself as a bene-
factor, but rather as a chump.
This sentiment portends trouble for the for-profit sector of the
human tissue industry. Even though the line between nonprofit and
for-profit entities involved in the human tissue industry is nebulous at
best, 22 the implication of this disclosure to patients is that the non-
profits are charitable (read "deserving") entities, whereas the for-
profits simply exist to enrich their shareholders. If donor families be-
have "rationally," then as mandatory disclosure guidelines are imple-
sections on a single consent form to distinguish the two types of donations. See, e.g., Louisiana's
Consent for Anatomical Gift, http://www.lopa.org/forms/2005%20Consent%2OForm-l.pdf (last
visited Sept. 30, 2005). These forms, however, do not provide, nor can they readily accommo-
date, the thorough disclosure about the end-uses of tissue donations urged by this analysis.
120. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Another recent survey of tissue donor fami-
lies conducted by the National Donor Family Council and Case Western Reserve University
indicated that families "would have preferred receiving more, rather than less, information to aid
them in their decision making .... 79 percent of families surveyed said that they would have
wanted to know that some tissue banks are for-profit ...." 70 Fed. Reg.06111, 6111.
121. See Henry Winthrop Ballantine, Mutuality and Consideration, 28 HARV. L. REV. 121, 121
(1914). Ballantine wrote:
From a nude pact no obligation arises. The courts have not felt impelled to extend a
remedy to one who seeks to get something for nothing. English law accordingly will
not usually enforce a promise unless it is given for value, or the promise of value, i.e.,
something which the law must assume to be of some value to the promisor and which
the parties make the subject of bargain or exchange.
Id.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS § 71 (1981) ("To constitute consideration, a
performance or a return promise must be bargained for.... A performance or return promise is
bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the
promisee in exchange for that promise.").
122. See Katz, supra note 11, at 961-62.
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mented, one would expect the supply of tissue available to for-profit
corporations to constrict rather dramatically. 123 Moreover, current
federal law severely restricts the options available to the industry in
responding to a diminished supply of human tissue. In this section, I
will discuss the legal barriers to remedying this threat.
1. NOTA and the Ban on Paying for Human Tissue
The biggest problem facing the for-profit tissue industry in the
event of a constricted supply of human tissue is that the most obvious
way to increase supply is presently illegal. The National Organ Trans-
plant Act of 1984 (NOTA) prohibits the payment of valuable consid-
eration to any person in exchange for organs or tissue.124 NOTA
does, however, permit compensation for the "reasonable" costs in-
curred by those who retrieve organs and tissue. 125 As a result of the
law's ambiguity in this regard, those involved in the retrieval and
processing of human tissue are permitted to recover what one expert
calls "supernormal profits" all in the name of covering their costs. 126
In fact, some question the extent to which "costs-based" compensa-
tion is actually somewhat of a cover for a symbiotic, or even a subver-
sive, relationship between the for-profit and the nonprofit sectors of
this industry.127
In virtually all cases, the donor family is not compensated, but in-
stead is expected to make a gift of its loved one's tissue.' 28 This law
often is touted as reflecting a belief that human organs and tissue be-
long with the sacred class of things deemed too valuable, and perhaps
too dangerous, to be treated as commodities.129 Of course, the reality
is that the market in human tissue is quite vibrant. The market for
123. Of course, some may continue to donate tissue for use by for-profit entities, recognizing
the benefit generated by the products they produce.
124. National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA), 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2000).
125. Id. § 274e(c)(2) ("[Tihe term 'valuable consideration' does not include the reasonable
payments associated with the removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation,
quality control, and storage of a human organ ....").
126. See Katz, supra note 11, at 947 (defining supernormal profits).
127. See Katches et al., supra note 2. See generally Katz, supra note 11 (discussing the diffi-
culty of reconciling NOTA's "reasonable" payment requirement with the current tissue indus-
ty's system of interreiated nonprofit and for-profit tissue agencies, culminating in the for-profit
tissue processors reaping supernormal profits from the sale of their patented tissue products).
128. Telephone Interview with Thomas Mone, supra note 27. Mone notes that on very rare
occasions, a family will respond to a solicitation by stating that they are quite poor and lack even
the funds needed to bury their loved one. In some of these cases, the OPO will offer, in ex-
change for the donation of the tissue or organs of the deceased, to make a donation to a local
church in order to cover funeral expenses. Id.
129. See Mahoney, supra note 54, at 173 (acknowledging and discussing some of the dangers
and concerns of placing a value on human body parts).
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human tissue simply excludes payment to the sources, so that the long
series of bargained-for exchanges that mark this industry begins after
the initial donation rather than with a purchase of raw materials.
Others have written extensively about the debate over whether to
compensate the donors of human tissue or their survivors.130 In per-
haps the most powerful critique of those who oppose such compensa-
tion, Professor Julia Mahoney noted that the system we presently have
is not at all gratuitous, but rather permits compensation-and indeed
profit-at every stage of utilization of donated tissue. Thus, she
concluded:
[T]he eradication of commerce in human biological materials would
require the total abandonment of the price system as a vehicle for
allocating rights to human components. In place of the price sys-
tem, rights associated with human biological materials would have
to be gratuitously transferred at every stage of distribution, with the
forces of generosity (or a governmental entity) guiding tissue from
its original human source to its ultimate consumer.131
Regardless of whether one accepts the argument that a market in
human tissue already exists or that it should be tolerated, if not em-
braced, by those who support the development of research and tech-
nologies utilizing human tissue, it is imperative to note that the new
regulations may render the debate moot. Instead, it seems that the
likely impact of the disclosure regulations will be to force considera-
tion of a human tissue market. If a substantial portion of families re-
spond to disclosure by refusing to donate their loved ones' tissue to
those who intend to use it to make money, and if the for-profit entities
are barred from offering to compensate families, then these entitites
will lose access to the raw material that they need in order to survive.
The companies will be forced either to restructure as nonprofit enti-
ties or to sell their patents and close their doors.132
130. See Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal Recognition
of Human Research Participants' Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 61 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 257 (2004). See also Charlotte H. Harrison, Neither Moore Nor the Market: Alternative
Models for Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 77 (2002).
131. Mahoney, supra note 54, at 197.
132. Another factor relevant to tissue supply is the issue of stem cells, which hold the poten-
tial to revolutionize healthcare in various areas, including the manufacture of various tissues. If
stem cells perform as hoped, the entire field of tissue transplantation might be transformed so as
to eliminate the need for donations. For instance, in the future, stem cells might be used to
develop specific tissues, such as skin, corneas, and bone, and the processing companies will be-
come distributors for the biotech firms that manufacture these tissues. Telephone Interview with
Joel Frader, Div. Head, Gen. Pediatrics, Children's Mem'l Hosp., Chicago, I1. (Sept. 2, 2005).
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2. The Problems Created by Paying for Human Tissue
Even if NOTA were amended to permit families to be compensated
for permitting OPOs to recover their loved ones' tissue, this practice
would trigger several complicated and related problems. First, an of-
fer to pay families for permitting the retrieval of their loved ones' tis-
sue would trigger the broader controversy associated with treating
body parts as market commodities, specifically the concern that such
commodification might be both degrading and potentially coercive. 133
Second, there is the practical problem of the effect of offering com-
pensation for tissue on the ability of the nonprofit sector to encourage
altruistic donations of tissue and organs. In this subsection, I will dis-
cuss the pricing problem, reserving discussion of the logistical
problems for the subsection that follows.
The problem of treating human tissue as a commodity was first
raised by the landmark case of Moore v. The Regents of the University
of California.134 In that case, researchers took cells from John Moore,
a leukemia patient, and used them to develop a cell line that had nu-
merous commercial applications. When Moore learned of this
"theft," he sued the doctors and researchers for a range of civil harms,
including not only their failure to obtain informed consent, but also
conversion. The California Supreme Court agreed that Moore had a
legitimate complaint for negligence due to the doctors' apparent fail-
ure to disclose their conflicts of interest.1 35
The court declined, however, to recognize Moore's claim for con-
version, finding that no case to date had recognized a property right in
human cells and worrying that doing so would "impose a tort duty on
scientists .... [This duty] would affect medical research of impor-
tance to all of society, implicat[ing] policy concerns far removed from
133. Of course, the claim that it is inherently offensive or impossible to set a price on human
body parts is spurious, as the industry already prices all sorts of human tissue once it is out of the
control of the donor's family. Likewise, the claim that there is too much harm inherent in offer-
ing compensation in exchange for organs has largely been refuted by the work of scholars such
as Michele Goodwin. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 5. Even if one is inclined to favor a ban on
the sale of human organs on the grounds that such offers would prove to be coercive and corro-
sive of human dignity, see, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV.
1849 (1987), this argument need not apply with equal force to the sale of human tissues taken
from the deceased. in the case of the latter, there is no real threat of coercion, and other than
arguments predicated upon the need to guard against the proverbial slippery slope, it is hard to
see why the offer of a small amount of compensation for human tissue undermines the dignity of
our species.
134. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (holding that the
plaintiff did not retain ownership interest in cells after they left his body and thus could not
assert conversion claim).
135. Id. at 484 (stating that "a physician who treats a patient in whom he also has a research
interest has potentially conflicting loyalties").
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the traditional, two-party ownership disputes in which the law of con-
version arose. '' 136 The court acknowledged that Moore had been
harmed, but they viewed the harm as dignitary in nature. In short, he
should have had the right to refuse to give his tissue away. The court
rejected Moore's claim that he was owed money by those who had
profited by taking his cells and using them to make a patented cell
line, stating: "[T]he theory of liability that Moore urges us to endorse
threatens to destroy the economic incentive to conduct important
medical research. If the use of cells in research is a conversion, then
with every cell sample a researcher purchases a ticket in a litigation
lottery." 137
Clearly, the Moore court overstated its concern when it opined that
the natural outcome of recognizing Moore's property interest in his
own cells would be to destroy the incentive to conduct scientific re-
search. 138 One might readily identify ways to compensate Moore for
the unauthorized taking of his cells without impeding the researchers'
capacity to reap a large profit. Indeed, this possibility is built into the
"disclosure" solution articulated by the Moore court.139
Researchers or organ procurement agents might seek permission
from a patient or his or her survivors to extract cells or tissue. Once
these solicitors disclose their personal motives, however, the prospec-
tive donors might refuse unless they receive some form of compensa-
tion. Nor is there reason to assume that the compensation should be
limited to a share in the profits that might ultimately be derived from
the tissue. Instead, the researchers or agents might offer a flat pay-
ment for the raw material that the patient provides to them. This is,
after all, in keeping with the way in which virtually every other for-
profit industry operates. One might seek to enlarge one's profit mar-
gin by paying the least amount possible for raw materials, but cer-
tainly a company has no reason to expect that raw materials should be
given to it free of charge.
136. Id. at 487.
137. Id. at 495-96.
138. Id. at 487.
139. Incidentally, this result is anticipated by the Brotherton case, in which the court permit-
ted a surviving spouse to sue, on due process grounds, for the wrongful taking of her deceased
husband's corneas. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991). One might as-
sume that the court's holding-"the removal of Steven Brotherton's corneas were caused by
established state procedures and that Ohio failed to provide the necessary predeprivation pro-
cess"-anticipates a monetary remedy for the wrongful taking. Id. at 482.
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3. Logistical Problems Generated by a Market Solution
Assuming that principled objections to paying for human tissue are
resolved and that the law comes to permit payment of some sort in
exchange for human tissue, there remain a host of logistical problems.
Ironically, these practical concerns may prove to be at least as tena-
cious as the problem of compensation itself.
One problem triggered by permitting payment for human tissue is
the issue of whether payment would then have to be offered for all
human tissue, and perhaps also for organs. 140 At first blush, it might
seem that the commercial market in human tissue could coexist with
the altruistic market. The tissue industry might offer prospective do-
nors of tissue, whether patients or their surviving families, the oppor-
tunity to donate to a charitable cause or to sell their tissue to a
commercial venture.
What complicates the prospect of permitting the altruistic market to
coexist with a commercial market in human tissue is the fact that, as of
today, the nonprofit industry does all of the soliciting and recovery of
tissue.1 41 Thus, one assumes that the agents for the nonprofit industry
would have both the task of soliciting donations of tissue and organs
for nonprofit uses and also the task of offering compensation for tis-
sue on behalf of for-profit corporations. This relegates to the OPO
agents a task rife with conflicts of interest, as one assumes that agents'
primary allegiance will be to their employers, which will require tissue
donations in order to maintain their enterprises. At the same time, it
may be too much to expect altruism from family members who would
be asked to choose between making a gift of tissue or being paid for it.
The direct juxtaposition of these options may spell the demise of the
altruistic system of organ and tissue donations. Furthermore, the
most readily apparent solution to this problem-to encourage the for-
profit industry to engage agents to solicit on its own behalf (a practice
that would be legal under current law)-raises the disturbing scenario
of multiple bedside solicitations.
Indeed, it is the timing of tissue solicitations, even if not accompa-
nied by an offer of money, that triggers the third concern I raise in
arguing that disclosure is not enough to resolve the problems inherent
in tissue solicitation.
140. It is worth noting that the current shortage of transplantable organs may mean that pay-
ment for "donations" is inevitable. See, e.g., Gretchen Reynolds, Will Any Organ Do?, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2005, (Magazine), § 6, at 37 (describing the use of "marginal" organs due to the
shortage of healthy transplantable organs). Several states offer tax incentives to families who
agree to donate the organs of a deceased family member. Id.
141. See Katz, supra note 11, at 955.
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C. Legal Concerns Regarding the Process of Solicitating Tissue
It is hard to imagine a less 'auspicious moment for negotiating a
transaction than the first twenty-four hours after the death of a loved
one. This time frame, so far removed from the state of mind one asso-
ciates with an ideal arm's length transaction, or even with a charitable
donation, is precisely the time during which families are asked to do-
nate their loved ones' tissue. The family's vulnerability raises troub-
ling legal problems in the event that the law permits payment for
tissue. Indeed, some of these legal concerns are present even if pay-
ment remains illegal.
1. The Law of Unconscionability and the Purchasing of Human
Tissue
In considering the scenario of solicitations for tissue, one cannot
help but call to mind the leading case on unconscionability, Williams
v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. 142 That case embraced the doctrine
of "unconscionability" in describing deals marked by "an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with con-
tract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. ' 143
Commentators have noted discomfort with the fact that the company
used door-to-door salesmen, whose contracts contained complicated,
one-sided legal terms and who approached their impoverished "buy-
ers" on the day the buyers received their monthly support allowance
from the government. 144
In the case of tissue solicitation, these same concerns are present,
and perhaps even heightened. There is the bedside or in-home solici-
tation of grieving family members, who do not seek out an opportu-
nity to make a deal, and may not even know that they are being asked
to negotiate. Add to this the imbalance of information, the time-pres-
sured nature of the decision families are asked to make, and the fact
that they are not in a position to investigate the meaning or validity of
the OPO agent's disclosure of the possible end uses of the tissue, and
it is hard to imagine that the resulting deals would withstand legal
scrutiny.
142. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
143. Id. at 449.
144. See Eben Colby, Note, What Did the Doctrine of Unconscionability Do to the Walker-
Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 625, 649 (2002) ("The furniture company em-
ployed salesman that went door-to-door and worked on commission. As such, there is little
doubt that many of the sales made by the furniture company were the result of high-pressure
sales tactics that pushed items that customers really did not need.").
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This latter concern about the fairness of the solicitation process is
properly viewed as a subset of the larger set of considerations regard-
ing the timing and nature of the solicitation of human tissue. As these
concerns exist regardless of whether families are offered compensa-
tion or simply are being asked to donate tissue, I will discuss them
together in the following subsection.
2. Ambulance Chasing, One-Sided Bargains, and the Bedside
Solicitation for Tissue
Setting aside the controversial issue of offering compensation for
tissue, one still must consider whether disclosure fully protects the
family from overreaching, given the sensitive nature of the timing of
the solicitation of donations of human tissue. To the extent that they
are behaving in an economically rational manner, one would expect
that most families would refuse to make gifts to the for-profit tissue
industry. After all, no matter how laudable the cause, corporate
America typically does not solicit individual members of the public for
donations. When the public's help is needed, individuals are offered
incentives to enter into contracts with businesses. 145 Items are offered
for sale at reduced prices. In extreme cases, an industry might seek
the government's assistance in sustaining it through a particularly dif-
ficult economic period. 146 But it strains credulity to imagine United
Airlines or Ford Motor Company asking the general public for dona-
tions to help support its corporate mission.
One must therefore think seriously about whether and why this in-
dustry might succeed in obtaining donations from individuals, even
after fully informing them about the profits that will be generated as a
result of their donations. In other contexts, the law recognizes the
vulnerability associated with death or other such trauma and attempts
to shield the bereaved individuals from those who might prey upon
them. Perhaps the best illustration of this practice is seen in the laws
governing the solicitation of clients by attorneys in the aftermath of
death or accident. Popularly known as "ambulance chasing," states
long have attempted to limit the rights of attorneys to solicit business
145. American car manufacturers, for instance, may offer incentives such as zero percent fi-
nancing or a certain amount of money to be returned to the customer upon purchase of a new
car (cash-back). See, e.g., Financing Options, http://www.safecarguide.com/gui/fin/financing.htm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
146. For instance, consider the use of bankruptcy laws to permit United Airlines to remain in
business. See Micheline Maynard, 2 Major Airlines Seen Near Bankruptcy Filings, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2005, at Al (discussing the possibility of Delta and Northwest Airlines joining United
Airlines by filing for bankruptcy in order continue operating while reorganizing under court
protection).
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from the newly bereaved. 47 Although lawyers' rights to advertise are
protected under the First Amendment,'148 the law long has limited the
scope of that right when the context for solicitation includes "any...
situation that breeds undue influence-by attorneys or their agents
. . ,149 The Court has singled out for particular scrutiny the practice
of in-person solicitation, finding that a state may regulate against it
without having to prove any actual injury:
Unlike . . . advertising . . ., in-person solicitation is not visible or
otherwise open to public scrutiny. Often there is no witness other
than the lawyer and the lay person whom he has solicited, rendering
it difficult or impossible to obtain reliable proof of what actually
took place. This would be especially true if the lay person were so
distressed at the time of the solicitation that he could not recall spe-
cific details at a later date.150
One might argue that the ambulance chasing laws are permissible
because the solicitation of clients by attorneys involves "pure com-
mercial speech," and thus is entitled to less constitutional protection
than the speech of those soliciting on behalf of nonprofit charities.
My point here is not that the state can or should limit OPO agents
from soliciting families of the deceased, but rather that the law com-
monly recognizes that bereaved individuals are so vulnerable to ex-
ploitation that they should be protected from those who would seek to
turn a profit from their tragedy. Surely it cannot be the case that
newly bereaved families need thirty days after a tragedy before they
are able to protect themselves from solicitations by a plaintiff's attor-
ney, but do not require any time at all before they can think critically
about whether to give away their loved ones' tissue to a company. It
is quite possible that the success of the OPO agents who solicit on
behalf of both nonprofit and for-profit users of human tissue will be a
147. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (upholding an attorney
advertisement rule which prohibited attorneys from contacting accident victims for thirty days
after the accident). The court determined that the rule withstood the three-pronged scrutiny test
for restrictions on commercial speech protected under the First Amendment because the state
bar had a substantial interest in protecting citizens from invasive conduct and the remedy for
such invasiveness was narrow in scope and duration. Id. at 635. OPO agents are no more sym-
pathetic than lawyers soliciting business from accident victims. Indeed, they are arguably less
sympathetic. Clearly, we can regulate them; the only question is how best to do so.
148. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
149. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978) (citing Bates, 433 U.S. at 366).
150. Id. at 466. See also Went For It, 515 U.S. 618 (upholding Florida's ban on direct-mail
solicitation of accident or disaster victims and their relatives during a thirty-day period following
the accident or disaster). "The Bar asserts that it has a substantial interest in protecting the
privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and their loved ones against intrusive, unsolic-
ited contact by lawyers." Id. at 624 (citing Brief of Petitioner at 25-27, Florida Bar v. Went For
It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995) (No. 94-226)).
936 [Vol. 55:903
WHEN THE TRUTH IS NOT ENOUGH
reflection of the fact that the donors' families simply were not emo-
tionally capable of behaving in a self-maximizing, or even a minimally
self-protective manner. 51
It is true, to be sure, that families in mourning engage in numerous
business transactions in the immediate aftermath of death. They buy
coffins, arrange for burial, hire an officiator, and contract for other
funeral-related expenses. But they affirmatively seek out these con-
tracts, choosing which companies to approach, when to approach
them, and deciding on their own which services to procure. 152 By con-
trast, the tissue solicitation "opportunity" comes to them within hours
of death, often in-person and at the hospital or in their homes.
If families agree to make donations of tissue to the for-profit tissue
industry, one must consider the likelihood that they do so because
they are in pain and distracted at the time of solicitation. It would
seem that this problem is an insoluble one, as the tissue transplanta-
tion industry must obtain its raw material during the first twenty-four
hours after death. 153 In the following section, I propose two solutions
that would minimize, if not altogether alleviate, the problem of family
vulnerability in the solicitation of human tissue.
VI. SOLUTIONS
If the government is interested in supporting participants in the or-
gan and tissue transplantation system as a whole, as well as all those
involved in the broader market in human tissue, the government has
no choice but to craft more sensitive regulations governing the process
of tissue solicitation. The problems identified in the preceding sec-
tions all speak to the need to separate the solicitation process from the
immediate aftermath of death, with its attendant emotionality and
vulnerability. If this is not feasible, then the government should at-
tempt to regulate the market in human tissue by permitting donors or
their families to be compensated at fixed rates for their donations. In
the paragraphs below, I briefly sketch out both of these proposals.
151. It is also possible that the family understands the nature of the solicitation and is com-
fortable supporting the industry. This may be particularly true in the event that the law contin-
ues to ban payment for human tissue, thereby reducing the family's options to two: giving the
tissue to the company, knowing that some good will come of it, or refusing to give altogether.
152. It is worth noting that the funeral industry is regulated by federal and state law in order
to protect vulnerable buyers from exploitation. See, e.g., Funeral Industry Practices, 16 C.F.R.
§ 453.2 (2003) (requiring that sellers make a number of pre-sale disclosures to buyers). For a
comprehensive review of the federal regulation of the funeral industry, see David E. Harrington
& Kathy J. Krynski, The Effect of State Funeral Regulations on Cremation Rates: Testing for
Demand Inducement in Funeral Markets, 45 J.L. & ECON. 199 (2002).
153. See Belli, supra note 9.
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A. Tissue Solicitation Prior to Death
Most of the problems discussed in previous sections exist only be-
cause of the difficulty of asking newly bereaved family members to
make a decision about donating tissue within twenty-four hours of
their loved one's death. This problem could be alleviated were there a
mechanism for conducting this solicitation ahead of time, by asking
competent individuals to declare their preferences regarding tissue
donation. 154
Such "advance directives" already exist with regard to organ dona-
tion. States typically facilitate the creation of a record of an individ-
ual's intent by the use of donor cards or driver's license check-off
provisions. 155 Although state laws vary in the extent to which these
advance directives are considered binding or merely indicative of the
deceased's intent with regard to donation, there is little doubt that this
evidence helps to generate awareness of the possibility of organ dona-
tion upon death. 156 As a result, these mechanisms reduce the uncer-
tainty and vulnerability of surviving family members asked to make a
quick decision about donation following death.
These mechanisms could be expanded to encompass the possibility
of tissue donation or, if compensation were to be permitted, of pay-
ment. Soliciting the participation of prospective tissue donors before
death would eliminate the risks inherent in attempting to inform fami-
lies and then solicit donations or strike bargains with them in the first
twenty-four hours after death. Instead, individuals would be alerted
to the existence of the industry, and they presumably would have time
to make an independent investigation into the merits of the industry.
The solicitation process would, of necessity, be more educational in
nature, as there would be little sense of urgency in attempting to se-
cure a specific recovery. The organ and tissue transplantation system
would be insulated from the problem of spillover harm due to the
need to explain the profit-making arm of the industry in great detail to
a mourning family. In all, there would seem to be little downside to
implementing procedures for soliciting tissue from individuals prior to
death, particularly to the extent that such solicitation is removed from
the healthcare setting, and thus, from the risk that a patient might feel
154. I am grateful to Mike Newdow, doctor, lawyer, and professional atheist, for thinking
through this problem with me, and for suggesting this solution.
155. See Sheldon F. Kurtz & Michael J. Saks, The Transplant Paradox: Overwhelming Public
Support for Organ Donation vs. Under-Supply of Organs: The Iowa Organ Procurement Study,
21 J. CORP. L. 767, 788 (1996).
156. See id.
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that his or her treatment will be affected by the decision of whether to
donate tissue.
B. Protecting Families in Post-Mortem Solicitations: The Need for
Set Rates of Compensation
As we have learned from the experience of efforts to increase organ
donation via donor cards and driver's license check-off options, it is
impossible to reach all members of society with this information. 157
Even with a system for securing tissue donation intentions prior to
death, there still will be a need for solicitation of human tissue from
surviving family members. If this is to occur, then we must be mindful
of the problems identified in the preceding section of this Article.
Unfortunately, the problems identified appear to suggest solutions
that are, at best, inconsistent. For instance, in order to ensure that
families are fully informed about the nature of the donation they are
being asked to make, an extremely detailed disclosure must be made.
At the same time, sensitivity to the context in which these solicitations
are made would seem to militate against a long, involved solicitation
process. Add to this the concern about the impact of disclosure on the
viability of both the nonprofit and the for-profit sectors of the human
tissue industry, and it would seem that OPO agents have little choice
but to launch into an extended monologue, despite the fact that this
will do little to educate or protect families in their time of grief.
One way to reduce the risk of overreaching during the solicitation
process is to involve disinterested parties in the solicitation.' 58 Were
the families to be represented by truly neutral "family advocates," for
instance, one might worry less about them being pressured into mak-
ing donations. Of course, it might be challenging to ensure the long-
term neutrality of such advocates, particularly if they were employed
by the institutions that care for the dying, let alone if they were paid
by the transplantation industry.
To my mind, the most efficient way around the many problems as-
sociated with the solicitation of tissue is to eliminate the gift or bar-
gain aspect of these transactions by establishing set rates of
compensation to be tendered in exchange for human tissue. This
might be accomplished in a variety of manners and need not trigger
157. Id. at 783 (arguing that drivers license check-off provisions and donor cards do not suffi-
ciently reach the donor pool and pointing to the fact that "[o]nly 43% of those generally sup-
porting the donation of organs for transplantation have an appropriate mark on their driver's
license").
158. I am indebted to Josh Shepton, Stanford Law School, Class of 2008, for developing this
idea.
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the advent of direct compensation to family members. 59 For exam-
ple, the law might require tissue recipients to donate, on a per ounce
basis, a fixed amount of their revenues to tissue-related charities. Skin
donations might generate donations to charities that support burn vic-
tims. If the law is concerned with maintaining and reinforcing the line
between the for-profit and the nonprofit industries dealing with
human tissue, the for-profit recipients might also be required to con-
tribute a percentage of their profits to specified nonprofit, transplant-
related entities.
I am less interested in determining the precise amount of the dona-
tion or compensation than I am in the ways in which this approach
resolves so many of the tensions discussed above. By acknowledging
the value of the raw material without which the human tissue industry
could not exist, this approach is more honest than the current system,
in which the donors are the only participants in the tissue industry
who do not share in the economic benefits it generates. Justice and
fairness are further enhanced by requiring those who benefit from tis-
sue donations, regardless of whether they are nominally structured as
for-profit or nonprofit entities, to pay something for their raw mate-
rial. By setting rates of compensation, the family need not be sub-
jected to a long solicitation process for which they are ill-equipped to
negotiate in their own self-interest. And by embracing a sense of fair-
ness, there is less risk that families will perceive the tissue and organ
industry as tarnished and refuse to donate altogether.
Because of the time-sensitive nature of the retrieval process for
human tissue and organs, there is no way to completely insulate vul-
nerable family members from the "ambulance chasing" problems in-
herent in the solicitation process. Offering families either
compensation at a set rate or the possibility of generating revenue for
a chosen charity does redress many of the most problematic aspects of
the solicitation process. The family is not asked to make a gift to a
for-profit industry, nor is it required to negotiate the sale of their
loved ones' "raw material." It would seem that the only remaining
reason why the family would need to be informed about the distinc-
tions between nonprofit and for-profit end-uses of tissue would in-
159. The offer of a fixed rate of compensation to family members in exchange for tissue would
not be unprecedented. For example, consider the former practice of the University of Michigan
hospital, which recognized the value it was deriving from the sale of discarded placentas to
downstream users by offering new mothers a minor rebate (twenty dollars) on their hospital
bills in exchange for their permission to use the placenta. This practice was discontinued when
federal regulations on tissue banking foreclosed the practice of selling tissue. Telephone Inter-
view with Edward Goldman, supra note 28.
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volve their right to object to the use of their loved ones' tissue for
cosmetic surgery.
VII. CONCLUSION
It took decades for the federal government to acknowledge and at-
tempt to prevent the predatory practices of some within the human
tissue industry. It is clear that the proposed regulations fall short of
their aim of shielding grieving families from the potentially exploita-
tive aspects of tissue solicitation. Moreover, as promulgated, these
regulations may have the unintended effect of curtailing or limiting
the available supply of transplantable organs and tissue. These
problems can be minimized first by endeavoring to solicit tissue from
competent individuals prior to death and second by offering some
form of compensation to families who agree to donate their loved
ones' tissue.
To be sure, there are risks inherent in injecting the possibility of
donor compensation into the market in human tissue. As ethicist Dr.
Joel Frader remarked, "Capitalism can't solve the problem of grief
and grief may render capitalism even more problematic and ugly than
it already is. '1 60 I believe that these risks can be cabined and are, in
any event, offset by the countervailing risks posed by the present sys-
tem both to families and to the entire organ and tissue industry. Ulti-
mately, the government has the moral and legal obligation to regulate
the market in human tissue by setting boundaries that preserve human
dignity as well as faith in the organ and tissue industry.
160. Telephone Interview with Joel Frader, supra note 132.
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